Blair: I've no regrets over decision to fight Saddam

Anger as 'sneaky' Blair arrives at Iraq inquiry by the back door

Mr Blair told the Iraq Inquiry he decided the dictator had to be removed because he posed too big a threat in the wake of the September 11 attacks in the United States.

He admitted intelligence that suggested Saddam had weapons of mass destruction had proved to be wrong, but said if he was put in the same position again he would make the same decisions.

"Sometimes what is important is not to ask the March 2003 question, but to ask the 2010 question," said Mr Blair during six hours of questioning by the five-strong panel.

"What we now know is that he retained absolutely the intent and the intellectual know-how to restart a nuclear and a chemical weapons programme.

"I have little doubt myself ... that today we would be facing a situation where Iraq was competing with Iran, competing both on nuclear weapons capability and competing more importantly perhaps than anything else, in respect of support of terrorist groups."

Mr Blair arrived two hours early for his long-awaited appearance at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre in London as he entered the conference centre away from the gaze of protesters and camera crews gathered outside.

He told the hearing that after September 11, the "perception of threat" posed by Saddam increased and by spring 2002 he was determined the dictator had to be removed, although he denied signing up to military action at that point.

He insisted he sought to push the Americans down the diplomatic route despite President George Bush deciding the United Nations Security Council's support "wasn't necessary", and stressed he worked on securing a consensus on the war "right up until the last moment".

Seeking to dismiss claims he had signed up to war in secret long before March 2003, Mr Blair said: "This isn't about a lie or a conspiracy or a deceit or a deception. It's a decision."

After a nervous start Mr Blair, wearing a navy blue suit and red tie, gave a largely-assured performance even when pressed over the controversial intelligence dossier which claimed it was "beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction which could be launched within 45 minutes.

"What I said in the foreword was that I believed it was beyond doubt. I did believe it and I did believe it was beyond doubt," he said.

He accepted however it had been a mistake not to make clear the now-notorious claim that some WMD could be launched within 45 minutes referred to battlefield weapons and not long-range missiles.

"I would have been better to have corrected it in the light of the significance it later took on," he said, insisting if he was acting now he would publish the intelligence service's own report rather than producing a political document.

Standing by his decision to go to war, he said: "The decision I took – and frankly would take again – was if there was any possibility that he could develop weapons of mass destruction we should stop him."

He defended the integrity of Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, who changed his mind before declaring the war to be legal, and said Britain could not have taken part in the military action if he had not come to a definitive view that it was legal.

Amid widespread criticism of the lack of preparation for the aftermath of war, Mr Blair insisted the Government had been "focused" on how to deal with issues caused by the conflict but there had been a total failure to predict the role played by al Qaida and Iran in fomenting the insurgency which broke out.

"The real problem is that our focus was on the issues that in the end were not the issues that caused us the difficulty," said Mr Blair, who insisted he had never turned down funding requests for troops.

The key questions

1: If there was no immediate threat from Iraq, why was the decision taken to invade that country and why at that particular time?

Mr Blair said his Iraq policy changed "dramatically" after 9/11. He feared hostile regimes could provide terror groups with WMD if they were allowed to develop them.

"From that moment Iran, Libya, North Korea, Iraq… all of this had to be brought to an end," he said. "The primary consideration was to send an absolutely powerful, clear and unremitting message that after September 11, if you were a regime engaged in WMD you had to stop." Saddam was targeted because he was already in breach of UN resolutions and had a history of using WMD.

2: Did you believe deposing Saddam Hussein was justified regardless of whether he was developing WMD?

Mr Blair blurred the distinction between disarmament and regime change. "These things were conjoined," he said. "It was an appalling regime. You couldn't run the risk of such a regime being allowed to develop WMD."

3: What prior assurances or guarantees did you give President Bush that Britain would follow the US to war?

Mr Blair strongly denied he had given any secret assurances to President Bush.

"My position was not a covert position," he said. "The only commitment I gave, and I gave this very openly, was to deal with Saddam. How we dealt with it was an open question."

4: Were Parliament and the public misled about Saddam Hussein's weapons programmes by the statements you made and the dossier you produced?

Mr Blair admitted the intelligence over WMD had been proven "wrong" but said Downing Street had not intentionally misled anybody. He insisted all the intelligence had indicated Saddam was pursuing WMD. The infamous '45-minute' claim, he said, had only become a major issue for people much later.

5: Why did you wait so long before requesting legal advice over the war, and was the attorney general pressured into declaring military action to be legal?

Mr Blair said he had not requested formal advice in 2002 because military action was at that point "a long way off", and denied any pressure had been put on the Attorney General, Lord Peter Goldsmith, to change his mind in early 2003 and back military action. The former Prime Minister also made it clear he would not have gone to war if the Attorney General had deemed it illegal.

6: Were British forces properly prepared and funded, and were their preparations hampered by your decision to keep them secret?

Mr Blair said early preparations for war were kept under wraps to avoid giving the impression a decision on military action had already been taken. He insisted it was not until October 2002 that the army told him more public planning was required, to which he immediately agreed.

He also said more funding would have been made available if needed.

7: Was the aftermath of the war properly planned for, and do you accept responsibility for the failures that occurred?

Mr Blair said there had been an "immense" amount of British post-war planning, which was partially successful. "We didn't end up with a humanitarian disaster," he said. "In fact we averted it."

But he accepted mistakes were made and said the post-war situation "was different to what we expected".

"People did not think al-Qaeda and Iran would play the role they did," he said.

8: When did you first realise Saddam Hussein probably did not have WMD, and what was your response?

Mr Blair said the realisation occurred slowly over the course of 2003 and 2004. "At the very beginning we were constantly getting reports about this site or that site, and we were trying to direct the armed forces there," he said. "But over the course of 2004 it became very difficult to sustain this."

9: What was Gordon Brown's role in the planning of the invasion, and how strongly did he back your stance?

The great unanswered question. The roles and viewpoints of Jack Straw, Geoff Hoon, Robin Cook, Claire Short and Lord Goldsmith were all discussed at length. But the then-Chancellor and second most powerful man in government was not mentioned in six hours of questioning.

10: What regrets do you have over the Iraq affair?

None. Mr Blair said there were lessons to be learnt in relation to the aftermath of the invasion, but was unrepentant about the fundamental decisions he made. He would have made the same decisions again.