Christoph Bluth: Obama must show courage to avoid chaos over Pakistan

With mounting frustration over the violation of Pakistani territorial sovereignty, the main route for Nato supply convoys through Pakistan was closed down.

Pakistani ill feelings were exacerbated by the revelation in Bob Woodward's recent book that 3,000 CIA operatives were on the ground in western Pakistan.

Unable to proceed, the Nato trucks became easy targets for the Taliban. After that were a number of attacks on the convoys, including a major assault on a group of fuel tankers near Quetta, setting numerous tankers alight and killing some of the drivers. Subsequently a war of words over whether Nato or the Pakistani security forces are responsible for safeguarding the convoys ensued.

Another bombshell in the already fractured US-Pakistani relationship was the Wall Street Journal revelation that Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Services (ISI) are pressing Taliban field commanders to fight the US in Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders are denying the allegations, saying that the government is making every effort to combat the militants. But having interviewed senior former ISI officials myself, I am fully convinced that these allegations ring true.

This comes at a time when the Obama administration has adopted a strategy, to be implemented by General Petraeus, which is based on the view that the real problem of militant extremism is in Pakistan.

This has resulted not only in an intensification of the campaign of drone attacks to eliminate Taliban and al-Qaida commanders, but also in increasing hot pursuits of fighters across the Afghan-Pakistan border.

The significance of these operations has been enhanced by intelligence reports about planned Mumbai-style raids in European cities. Abdul Jabbar, a British citizen who was alleged to have been trained to lead such a raid, was apparently killed in drone attack. But the American strategy will only work if there is increasing co-operation between Nato forces and the Pakistani army.

Pakistan and the United States are supposed to be close partners in the war against the Taliban and al-Qaida. Pakistan is the frontline state in the global war on terror. But from the very beginning this was a deeply troubled relationship.

The Taliban was supported by the ISI from the very beginning. After 9/11, the then President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, bowed to monumental pressure from the Bush administration and joined the fight against the extremists. But while accepting billions in US dollars in aid to fight the terrorists, the Pakistani government was playing a dual game.

While doing enough to hunt down foreign fighters to appease the US, the ISI was secretly in contact with the Taliban leadership in Quetta, providing advice and tangible support. The calculation was that one day the Americans would leave, and Pakistan wanted to have a friendly Afghan government in place to exclude any Indian and Iranian influence.

For Pakistan, the Karzai government in Afghanistan is the enemy. Not surprisingly this led to increasing tension with the United States faced with the intolerable situation of Taliban fighters finding refuge and support in Pakistan.

An apology from the US ambassador seems to have temporarily assuaged Pakistani anger and the re-opening of the Torkham crossing has been announced. But the fundamental tension in US-Pakistan relations has not disappeared.

President Zardari's political position is growing steadily weaker as the resources of Pakistan are overwhelmed by the catastrophic floods.

A complete breakdown in US-Pakistani relations is still a real possibility. This would make the current US strategy for counter- insurgency unworkable.

What is needed is a bold vision for repairing US-Pakistani relations. Pakistani mistrust of the US exists on several levels. The close strategic partnership with its arch rival India creates a sense of vulnerability in Islamabad. This is exacerbated by the perception that the US is an unreliable partner for Pakistan, alternating between public support and condemnation, financial aid and economic sanctions.

The most important step for the US would be to promote reconciliation between India and Pakistan by actively working for a solution of the Kashmir problem. This is not an easy task, but nothing will do more to deal with roots of conflict and instability in the region than to tackle the persistent conflict between India and Pakistan.

The United States has never been in a stronger position to

exert its influence. This is the time for a bold and courageous initiative by the Obama administration, without which the region might further descend into chaos.