Christoph Bluth: Unity, war or chaos – the choices for Korea

In Seoul this unacceptable act of aggression led to a furious reaction by the Lee government and South Korea cut almost all diplomatic and economic ties with the North. Now the North Koreans have raised their game of risk-taking to a new level with the shelling of Yeonpyeong island, where South Korean naval forces were conducting military exercises late last month.

The seeming impotence of South Korean forces, which reacted slowly and failed to destroy the North Korean artillery position has turned this incident into a national humiliation for the Republic of Korea. The minister of defence was dismissed, and a radical re-think has begun of relations with North Korea.

Until now the Americans and South Koreans shared a fundamental assumption that the risks of war on the peninsula are such that North Korean provocations should be met with symbolic gestures and economic sanctions, but that a counterattack was too dangerous.

This is now changing. The mood in the South Korean government, under pressure from an anxious and angry population, has shifted to a more aggressive stance. Thus President Lee Myung-bak declared that he would order an attack on North Korean missile bases in the event of further provocations, while Pyongyang angrily denounced joint US-ROK naval exercises and threatened further artillery strikes.

In the US government the view is gaining ground that the existing policy of restraint is interpreted as weakness and that Washington and Seoul need to respond forcefully in order to deter North Korean aggression. There is even the suggestion that the United States should redeploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

So far, North Korea has played the role of the "mad man" who is willing to risk all-out war, counting on an averseness to risk on the part of the United States and South Korea. This may not work the next time around. The allies will seek to inflict a decisive and humiliating defeat on the North to deny Pyongyang the kind of internal propaganda benefits that its actions are designed to achieve.

How can we explain North Korea's aggressive behaviour? One key factor is the crisis of the leadership succession that has been on-going since Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008. Kim Jong-eun is not a very plausible candidate, he lacks any leadership or military experience and at 27 years of age he is still very young in a culture where the young defer to the older.

A nuclear test, a missile launch in defiance of a UN Security Council Resolution and military actions against South Korea were all designed to bolster the credentials of the new heir to the dynastic leadership. The botched currency reform of 2009 which confiscated the savings of ordinary people and practically collapsed the private economy was allegedly masterminded by Kim Jong-eun.

The level of risk assumed shows just how difficult and precarious the situation is for the Kim regime. If the transition fails, if other elements of the North Korean military elite take over power after Kim Jong-il's death, it is likely that many members of the Kim family will be executed. This explains the prominent role now played by Kim Jong-il's sister and her husband Jang Song-taek in managing the transition to the next generation.

All of this has prompted the US and South Korea to consider the possibility that the present turmoil may signify the beginning of the end for North Korea. China is also weighing its options carefully. Despite the revelations on WikiLeaks that some senior Chinese officials would accept a unified Korea governed by Seoul, the Chinese government has paid a high political price to support the transition of the leadership to Kim Jong-eun in order maintain stability.

Now it is confronted with the risk of escalating conflict on the Korean peninsula. Its call for an urgent meeting of the Six Party Talks is a manifestation of the alarm that has gripped the government in Beijing. Indeed the situation has become much more dangerous. It is now incumbent on China and Russia to exert all the influence they have to prevent further military provocations by Pyongyang.

Until now, the military stalemate and the capacity of the DPRK leadership to maintain itself in power through the brutal use of totalitarian means of control have maintained the illusion of stability. Both in Washington and Beijing there seemed to be no other alternative than to perpetuate this situation in order to avert all the catastrophic alternatives.

But the failing regime in Pyongyang cannot endure indefinitely. We may be entering a period of prolonged internal strife in North Korea accompanied by increasing military provocations.

This situation will require courageous leadership from President Obama. The temptation to escalate the tension must be firmly resisted. Much closer coordination between the US, China and Russia will be necessary to manage this troublesome period. The British Government, which maintains embassies in Pyongyang and Seoul, can play a useful role as a mediator.

More importantly still, the question of the future of the Korean peninsula as a whole can no longer be postponed. In order to avert the catastrophe of an all-out war, or the chaos of collapse, some agreement on a path to a unified Korea is essential. This is the challenge that lies ahead.

Christoph Bluth is professor of politics and international studies at the University of Leeds.