Danny Alexander: We need a different kind of nuclear deterrent

But I can also attest to the fact that those same people I worked with on the understand the necessity for the nation’s economy to be strong. They recognise that our nation’s defence is built on our nation’s prosperity.

As Cicero put it: “Finances are the sinews of war.” Prosperity and security: these are the first order responsibilities of Government. They are inextricably linked – it is almost impossible to have one without the other for any sustained period of time.

To ensure both has required this Government to take some very tough decisions, including the most thorough review of nuclear systems and postures the UK has undertaken for decades. And more – this detailed and forensic analysis challenges conventional and outdated thinking about our nuclear posture.

For the first time in a generation, the Trident Alternatives Review shows that there are credible and viable alternatives to the United Kingdom’s current approach to nuclear deterrence.

A different approach would allow the UK to contribute meaningfully to the new multilateral drive for disarmament, initiated by President Obama, while maintaining our national security and our ultimate insurance policy against future threats.

And it could allow long-term savings to be made against current plans – savings of about £4bn over the life of the system.

Let me be clear, this does not change current Government policy to maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent and prepare for a successor system. But it does mean that we can, at last, have an open and much more informed debate about what our nuclear weapons are for and how they should be deployed.

And it provides us with a chance to change course before the decision for a successor system is taken in 2016. I want to make the case for taking this opportunity.

Trident is the last, unreformed bastion of Cold War thinking. Britain in the 21st century, almost a quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, needs to think about nuclear deterrence and disarmament in a fresh way.

We can adapt our nuclear deterrence to the threats in the 21st century by ending 24 hour patrols when we don’t need them, and buying fewer submarines. That way we can take a big step down the ladder of disarmament and keep our country safe. In 2010, the new coalition Government inherited a defence programme that was not fit for this twin purpose.

First, and most urgently, the finances of the defence programme were hopelessly out of balance. Thanks to difficult decisions, the defence budget is now in balance and the programme on a firm 10 year footing. And it is because of this firm grip on the transformation of the MoD that the Government is able to guarantee a real terms rise in the defence equipment and support budget from 2015 and have been able to make further savings in day to day spending without any further reductions in uniformed personnel.

But there is one area of policy that remains unreformed – our nuclear weapons policy. The two parties in Government, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, have very different approaches.

The Conservatives supported the last Labour Government’s decision in 2006 to press ahead with the procurement of a like for like replacement for the Vanguard class submarines to carry the Trident D5 missiles. The Liberal Democrats, however, voted against like for like replacement in 2007. My party has argued that the decision was premature and that no serious consideration was made of alternative systems that could provide long-term financial savings and be more suitable to the threat Britain faces now and in future. What is at issue is not whether we should possess nuclear weapons, but how the scale and posture of our nuclear weapons capability can change.

So the Review was tasked to answer three questions. First, are there credible alternatives to a submarine-based deterrent? Second, are there credible submarine-based alternatives to the current proposal? Third, are there alternative nuclear postures which could maintain credibility?

The conclusion I draw is that there is no new system available before the lives of the current Vanguard submarines come to an end that meets those criteria.

And blame for this narrowing of options falls squarely at the feet of the previous Labour Government. But there is a step down the nuclear ladder still available – ending 24 hour patrols and procuring fewer Successor submarines.

For the country, publication of this review marks the start of a national debate on one of the most profound questions of our time. Let us move to break out of the orthodoxy that has stifled debate on nuclear weapons in 
this country.