Rachel Utley: Hollande under fire on home front in battle over Syria

Since evidence emerged of the use of chemical weapons in Damascus on August 21, France has been at the forefront of international condemnations of the attack.

Paris was also quick to support the prospect of intervention against the Syrian regime; Hollande insisted “all options are on the table” and promised a broad-based response alongside the US, drawing on Arab League and European support.

Perhaps to Hollande’s credit, he and his government have consistently advocated international engagement to alleviate the worsening crisis in Syria since his election last year, marshalling external support for the opposition through the Friends of Syria group and providing medical and humanitarian assistance for hundreds of thousands of refugees who have fled principally to Jordan and Lebanon.

Less creditable for some, and at times ahead of its allies and public opinion, France has offered practical (including military) assistance as anti-regime forces have grown in strength, and was the first to recognise the Syrian National Coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. And on the possibility of Assad’s resort to chemical weapons, Hollande maintained this would be “a legitimate reason for direct intervention”.

The downside of such identification with the crisis is that France has not only been increasingly engaged, but has also become enmeshed. As the use of chemical weapons has been confirmed, and as intelligence reports have laid the blame at Assad’s door, the logic of France’s position and the cumulative effects of the pressures it brought to bear meant Hollande had little choice but to commit to the prospect of intervention.

Subsequent developments however – including the British “No” vote in the House of Commons, President Obama’s difficulties in making the case for intervention in the US, the French National Assembly debate on Syria, and the latest initiative to put Syrian chemical weapons under international control – have all illustrated the extent to which the French president appears to have been overtaken by events,

Firstly, Hollande has not succeeded in carrying the argument at home. He is a beleaguered president, sitting low in opinion polls, and both public and political opinion has been unswayed by his stance on Syria.

In the parliamentary debate on Wednesday last week, not only was the principle of intervention without a UN mandate resoundingly unpopular, but even the principle of the debate itself was seen to question Hollande’s political acumen (under the French Constitution the president does not require parliamentary approval to commit French forces in military action).

Secondly, there were valid questions about French military capabilities to intervene against the Syrian regime. Despite the now prolonged civil war, Assad’s regime remains a formidable military power. As Assad himself increasingly took to the airwaves to threaten direct retaliation against France should military action take place, this only underlined the ramifications of Hollande’s choices.

Thirdly, diplomatic credibility was also at issue. Hollande seemed to misjudge significantly the mood of his allies and partners. US opinion was divided; UK participation was precluded; partners in the EU did not weigh in with offers of military help; Arab League support was limited. The UN has to date remained split, and the prolonged antagonism of Russia (alongside alignment with the US) goes well against the French diplomatic grain.

So Paris has taken refuge in the UN, and in advancing a UN Security Council resolution to place Syrian chemical weapons under international control before destroying them. The resolution would be backed by the threat of military measures in the event of Assad’s non-compliance.

It remains to be seen whether sufficient common ground with the previous Russian proposal can be agreed to return the UN to significance in this crisis (and to buy off French domestic disquiet with the prize of a UN mandate for intervention). .

Many have commented on the significance of the House of Commons’ failure to agree a UK role in any US military action against Syria and the future of the “special relationship”.

Ironically, given the apparently elevated French stance as the Americans’ principal military partner in such a venture, Hollande’s willingness to assume this role may yet further undermine his standing both at home and abroad – an unfortunate outcome for a president whose abhorrence at the stream of events in Syria has seemed genuine.

*Dr Rachel Utley is a lecturer in international history at the University of Leeds.