YP Letters: Blame Generals, not the troops, over Iraq war aftermath

From: Major Chris Gallacher, TD VR, Middlesbrough.
A Royal Marine searches a prisoner during the 2003 Iraq War. Photo credit: PA/PA WireA Royal Marine searches a prisoner during the 2003 Iraq War. Photo credit: PA/PA Wire
A Royal Marine searches a prisoner during the 2003 Iraq War. Photo credit: PA/PA Wire

The long-awaited Chilcot report laid a great deal of blame at Tony Blair’s door and the constant defence by the likes of Alastair Campbell makes my blood boil. Why are they given the oxygen of publicity to shout down the complaints?

However, the report also lays some blame on the military and I would like to comment on it.

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Sir John Chilcot is correct that very senior members of the Armed Forces did not hold true to their view that, following the first Gulf War, the Army in particular needed time to deal with the reduction and changes in force make-up and structures.

This, however, was not adhered to, resulting in commitment of forces before they were ready.

The Army was committed to a war fighting role which we were equipped and trained to accomplish. However, for the subsequent counter insurgency operation we did not have the equipment or training to deal with it, or the required troop levels.

The equipment needed was not available until after many years operating in Afghanistan, as you cannot go down to your local arms dealer and get what you want.

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It takes time and the use of Snatch Land Rovers was totally inadequate.

To sum up, the military are directed by their political masters in much of what they do or wish to do, and Chilcot in some ways diverted attention from the real villain in this affair.

The Generals were weak in their resolve to please their political masters and for this they are at fault – not the soldiers, who did their utmost to achieve their aim and do their duty in extremely difficult circumstances.

From: Robert Bottamley, Thorn Road, Hedon.

The Yorkshire Post, July 13, reported Lord Blunket’s imitation of his master’s voice in responding to Sir John Chilcot’s verdict on the Iraq war – which is to say that ‘based on the information and context of the time he would have reached the same decision’.

And so what does that tell us?

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That, given the opportunity, he would repeat the error of listening only to the voices he chose to hear.

That, offered the chance, he would again fail to ask the questions that ought to have been asked.

To sum, that Lord Blunkett – ironically enough, perhaps best remembered for his time as Secretary of State for Education – has himself learned precisely nothing.