Richard Heller: This is no whitewash...Chilcot exposes Tony Blair

THE Iraq inquiry report had two monumental tasks for the British state. The first was to pass judgment on British involvement in the Iraq war and occupation. The second was to convince the British people that those who govern them will ultimately face responsibility for weakness, error, failure and deceit.
Sir John Chilcot launches his inquiry into the Iraq war.Sir John Chilcot launches his inquiry into the Iraq war.
Sir John Chilcot launches his inquiry into the Iraq war.

The long delay in the inquiry has prompted serious questions. Could it have done more to resist Whitehall’s demands for secrecy and suppression? Did it put itself at Whitehall’s mercy by negotiating over what it could publish as “gists and quotes” of key documents? Would counsel have cross-examined witnesses more expeditiously and effectively? In the so-called “Maxwellization process”, did the inquiry allow those criticised too long to defend their reputations?

These questions remain and should be resolved before we undertake (as is depressingly likely) any large-scale inquiry into some future disaster.

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However, it is more important now to look at some of the report’s major findings. These can only be first impressions. It runs to 2.6 million words: the executive summary alone has over 900 paragraphs.

But it is immediately clear that the report is not another expensive whitewash. Many of its conclusions are devastating.

The inquiry says plainly that war was unnecessary in March 2003. The UN weapons inspectors were making progress and preparing to step up their activities. “The UK went to war without the explicit authorisation which it had sought from the Security Council... the point had not been reached where military action was the last resort.”

The inquiry declined to offer a judgment on the legality of the war, but the last sentence is judgment enough. It is a long-standing principle of international law that war must be a last resort. Since the advent of the United Nations, a war undertaken before the Security Council has determined that a UN process is exhausted is unlawful.

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Paragraphs 306 to 324 destroy a central part of Tony Blair’s case for war: the supposed risk that Saddam’s Iraq would arm al-Qaida and other terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction. Paragraph 324 says bluntly: “There was no basis in the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) assessments to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat.”

Paragraphs 344 to 356 show that Blair was warned clearly that war against Saddam would increase the risk that terrorists would acquire WMD and heighten the domestic terrorist threat against this country. Paragraph 358 shows how he ignored the warnings.

Paragraphs 590 to 601 lay bare the failure of the government to anticipate known risks in Iraq after the conflict. Paragraph 630 notes bleakly “When Mr Blair set out the vision for the future of Iraq... on 18 March, 2003, no assessment had been made of whether that vision was achievable” and “no agreement had been reached with the US on a workable post-conflict plan”.

All in all I counted just over 200 key findings in the report. Of these nearly 70 could be interpreted as critical, the remainder as factual or neutral. None were admiring.

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Tony Blair’s immediate response relied heavily on a claim to have acted in good faith. There is plenty of evidence in the report to dispute this, but good faith is not a defence to negligence and to causing suffering or death by negligence.

The surgeon who puts his knife in the wrong place, the engine driver who pulls the wrong lever, must face the consequences of their errors. If they fell far below the standard of competence expected in their profession and caused the deaths of people to whom they had a duty of care they are potentially guilty of manslaughter.

Mr Blair – and others criticised – should now be judged against the same standard. Because of their actions, or inactions, Britain committed itself to a war which was unnecessary, unlawful, and, for Britain, 
totally unprofitable. It then assumed responsibilities for 
an occupation which it was wholly unable to discharge. The country it was supposedly liberating became a charnel house.

The inquiry has achieved its first task. It has made judgments both on policy and on the details of its implementation. But the second task is beyond its reach. Most of the people criticised have disappeared from public office into comfortable or lucrative retirements. Tony Blair continues to hawk himself about for money and to issue pronouncements and advice as a global statesman.

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Parliament, the police service and the law officers should now examine the inquiry report in depth. They should consider whether the shortcomings it exposes crossed the threshold of malfeasance in office or even gross negligence.

Without such an effort, faith in the British state and its rulers will continue its steady collapse.

Richard Heller is a political writer who advised Denis Healey.