Christopher Martin: Why it makes no sense for Britain to cling on to Trident

Why, then, is the Cold War Trident nuclear deterrent sacrosanct? Liam Fox has revealed the rift between the Treasury and the MoD. In short, the Treasury wants the MoD to bear the replacement costs of Trident – 20bn over the next 10 years.

Usually central funds cover replacement with the MoD covering running costs. If the Treasury gets its way, this will have serious implications for the defence budget and other capital projects.

This is not an article against the deterrent, but it is important to understand that the deterrent only has its place within a broader security strategy. The Government claims that Trident is insurance for an uncertain future and a guarantee that the UK would remain a global player. This is fine up to a point. But without major conventional capability, what use is Trident? The concern is that this Government will axe much in conventional forces with the deficit as cover, in complete disregard for our real interests.

Defence will be treated like all other departments of government – but defence is unlike all other government departments. Investment needs to be very long-term, consistent and with a grand strategic vision.

Let's get one thing clear, there are no direct existential threats to the UK home islands. So why do we need forces for our "defence"? The answer is that we no longer speak of defence, we speak of security. That is because what is, or might be, a threat to the UK is probably going to be at distance, is unlike traditional threats faced in the past, and needs to encompass a much wider notion of what needs to be secured.

The UK is a major political and economic player in the global system. Furthermore, we are an island, something most of us forget. Ninety per cent of our oil and gas comes via the sea. We are massively dependent upon the global maritime economy which has doubled in volume in the decade since 2000 and which, crucially, operates on a "just enough, just in time" basis.

This makes it very vulnerable to disruption and if it were disrupted we should suffer in this country to a degree unprecedented.

Furthermore, our integration into this global maritime economy is permanent, vital and expanding. We require a stable global economic and political order for the well-being of this country; it is vital we commit to help sustain it.

All this leads to this point: our security is, and must be founded on a maritime-first basis. It is only by maintaining the investment and commitment to a capable, flexible, deployable Royal Navy can we

contribute to maintaining this global system.

Developments overseas tend to indicate that our greatest security challenges will be at sea in the future as states seek to protect and develop mineral rights in exclusive economic zones and as the main maritime communication routes become threatened by increasing disorder at sea. Additionally, if in future we have to deploy our other forces overseas, then we can only do so by sea.

There is also a political aspect to this. Navies are not just for warfighting. The most vital capability of maritime power is political. The diplomatic value of maritime power is incalculable. Well, not absolutely: the mere presence of naval forces in the Gulf in 1990 saved OECD countries $69.5bn just through stabilising oil prices. A maritime capability protects hard interests, provides diplomatic and political clout and supports forces overseas.

The new aircraft carriers, which might well be a victim of short-sighted financial cuts, will each be 70,000 tonnes of diplomacy, ready for deployment to support our interests. Can the same be said of Trident? If we lack the conventional forces to engage in the world, is any foreign government really expected to believe that Trident, which would then be our first line of defence not our last, would be in play?

Of course not, because it is not credible. In any event, why should the US provide us with the missiles if we are not a player in maintaining global security? Nuclear weapons have a place in a security policy; they cannot be the security policy.

Canada has been held up as the fiscal model we should follow. But Canada treated defence like all other departments and slashed. In 2005, the Canadian government announced it would remain committed to being a global player. The announcement was ridiculed by the Canadian Senate which stated: "Who listens to Canada's words? Influence is predicated on paying your dues and Canada is not."

We, too, have to see that we have to pay our dues if, as the Government claims, it wants to remain a global player. However, when tough choices are being made treating Trident as sacrosanct is a strategic, fiscal and political nonsense.

Dr Christopher Martin is Lecturer in War and Security Studies at the Centre for Security Studies, University of Hull.